Gareth, Clara, Stephanie, Jillian


Washington Naval Conference
·Called by Warren G. Harding.
·Nine nations attended the conference, however soviet Russia was not invited.
·First disarmament conference in history.
· Primary objective of the conference was to restrain Japanese naval expansion.
·Wanted to eliminate tension between Anglo-American, agree upon a favorable naval ratio, and to have the Japanese accept the continuance of the open door policy.
·Led to an effective end to building new battleships. They were limited on size and armament.

London Disarmament Conferences
·First Conference
o 10 nations were present
o Made declarations of London

·Second Conference
o UK, USA, France, Italy, and Japan attended.
o Main change was battleship tonnage.
o USA, UK, Japan changed the battle ship ratio to a more even number.
o Agreed on a 5 year halt of capital ships.
o Continuation of limits for aircraft carriers from the Washinton Naval Conference.
o Restrictions on Submarine warfare.

·Third Conference
o Japan backed out of the naval agreements for amount of ships.
o France, UK, USA agreed on the naval restrictions however, but by 1938 they were breaking the rules
for ship restrictions.

Geneva Naval Conferences
·Held to restrict naval arms. (1937)

·Basically held to fix the agreements made at the Washington conference
o Rules were being broken
o Washington conference was confined to limitations on aircraft carriers and battleships.
o Countries would build large amounts of cruisers, submarines etc. because the Washington conference
o Was not specific enough.
o USA had far few cruisers then other powerful countries.

·France and Italy declined the invitation to the conference.

·USA wanted to extend the naval limitations, Japan and UK agreed. However an agreement couldn�t be reached. The naval race would continue.

Source A:

(Primary Source)
Conference on the Limitation of Armament, Washington, Nov.12 1921-Feb.6 1922

From: Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: 1922, Vol. 1, pp. 247-266.

Article IV
The total capital ship replacement tonnage of each of the Contracting Powers shall not exceed in standard displacement, for the United States 525,000 tons (533,400 metric tons); for the British Empire 525,000 tons (533,400 metric tons); for France 175,000 tons (177,800 metric tons); for Italy 175,000 tons (177,800 metric tons); for Japan 315,000 tons (320,040 metric tons).
Article V
No capital ship exceeding 35,000 tons (35,560 metric tons) standard displacement shall be acquired by, or constructed by, for, or within the jurisdiction of, any of the Contracting Powers.
Article VI
No capital ship of any of the Contracting Powers shall carry a gun with a calibre in excess of 16 inches (406 millimetres).
Article VII
The total tonnage for aircraft carriers of each of the Contracting Powers shall not exceed in standard displacement, for the United States 135,000 tons (137,160 metric tons); for the British Empire 135,000 tons (137,160 metric tons); for France 60,000 tons (60,960 metric tons); for Italy 60,000 tons (60,960 metric tons); for Japan 81,000 tons (82,296 metric tons).
Article VIII
The replacement of aircraft carriers shall be effected only as prescribed in Chapter II, Part 3, provided, however, that all
aircraft carrier tonnage in existence or building on November 12, 1921, shall be considered experimental, and may be replaced, within the total tonnage limit prescribed in Article VII, without regard to its age.
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Source B:


Cartoonists' comment on the World Disarmament Conference 1932-34
"My friends, we have failed. We just couldn't control your warlike passions"
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Source C:

Geneva Naval Conference, June 20-August 4, 1927 -

The US, UK and Japan met in Geneva and began negotiations on the extension of naval limitations. Matters were complicated when the British revealed that, since under the Washington Treaty they had measured their ships in legend tons rather than standard tons, their capital ships actually totalled some 604,000 tons. This brought the tonnage ratios of the British, American, and Japanese battle fleets closer to a 6:5:3 ratio than the 5:5:3 ratio at which the Americans had aimed.

The differences between the parties emerged in several areas. First, there was a dispute about whether �parity� should be measured based on tonnage or number of vessels. The United States preferred tonnage, while the British preferred to count the fleet. To keep overall tonnage below the established limits, the British preferred to build light cruisers, but because light cruisers were essentially useless in battle against heavy cruisers, they wanted the United States and Japan to build the lighter variety as well. The United States had virtually no use for light cruisers and felt that as long as they stayed below the tonnage limit, they should be able to build as many heavy cruisers as they liked. It was a fundamental impasse.

The failure of the conference can be attributed to the inability of the United States and Great Britain to come to terms on these issues; one side or both needed to make substantial compromises to solve the problem. In the wake of the failed talks at Geneva, the United States Congress passed a bill to build fifteen new cruisers and an aircraft carrier, and thereby joined the naval arms race. By February 1929 expanded American cruiser building program brought the number of cruisers built, building, or authorized to thirty-three, twenty-three of them of the heavy 8" gun type that so concerned the British. This led Japan and Britain to consider their own building programs, making the result of the conference a potential new arms race, rather than limitation.
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Source D:


Hradcany Square
Prague, Czech Republic

Now, one of those issues that I'll focus on today is fundamental to the security of our nations and to the peace of the world -� that's the future of nuclear weapons in the 21st century.
The existence of thousands of nuclear weapons is the most dangerous legacy of the Cold War. No nuclear war was fought between the United States and the Soviet Union, but generations lived with the knowledge that their world could be erased in a single flash of light. Cities like Prague that existed for centuries, that embodied the beauty and the talent of so much of humanity, would have ceased to exist.

Today, the Cold War has disappeared but thousands of those weapons have not. In a strange turn of history, the threat of global nuclear war has gone down, but the risk of a nuclear attack has gone up. More nations have acquired these weapons. Testing has continued. Black market trade in nuclear secrets and nuclear materials abound. The technology to build a bomb has spread. Terrorists are determined to buy, build or steal one. Our efforts to contain these dangers are centered on a global non-proliferation regime, but as more people and nations break the rules, we could reach the point where the center cannot hold.

Now, understand these matters to people everywhere. One nuclear weapon exploded in one city -� be it New York or Moscow, Islamabad or Mumbai, Tokyo or Tel Aviv, Paris or Prague �- could kill hundreds of thousands of people. And no matter where it happens, there is no end to what the consequences might be -� for our global safety, our security, our society, our economy, to our ultimate survival.

Source E:

Disarmament Conference-

The Allied Powers (with the exception of the United States) after World War I committed themselves to disarmament in the Treaty of Versailles and in the Covenant of the League of Nations. The United States participated in the limitation of naval armaments by the Washington Conference (1921-22) and the London Naval Conference (1930). In 1925 the League of Nations set up a preparatory commission to determine what arms should be limited and how this could be accomplished. By 1931 several points of agreement had been reached and a draft for discussion at the Disarmament Conference drawn up. The conference opened in Geneva in Feb., 1932, and was attended by League of Nations members, as well as by the United States and the Soviet Union. Disagreements over the definition of categories of war materials, which had obstructed the progress of the preparatory commission, continued to hinder the conference. Intent on maintaining its security against Germany, France was particularly reluctant to agree to any type of military limitation. Germany, whose military power had been severely limited by the Treaty of Versailles, responded by claiming that if world disarmament to the German level was not accomplished, Germany had the right to rearm and achieve military equality. Deadlock ensued. The conference was in adjournment from June to Oct., 1933. When it reassembled, Germany, now under the control of Adolf Hitler and already preparing to rearm, withdrew (Oct. 14) from the conference and from the League of Nations. The conference again adjourned, and reconvened only sporadically thereafter. It ceased to meet after May 1, 1937. By this time the general expansion of armaments that preceded World War II was already under way, and any hope for disarmament was unrealistic.
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5 Sources
1. From: Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: 1922, Vol. 1, pp. 247-266.

the WHITE HOUSE president Barack Obama,April 5,2009


1. a) According to source C, what is to be blamed for the failure of the conference?
b) Are there any symbols in the cartoon? What are they? Why were these symbols chosen?
2. Compare and contrast the reasons why the conferences failed in sources C and E.
3. With reference to their origin and purpose, assess the value and limitations of source A and C.
4. Using these sources and your own knowledge, discuss whether or not the concerns of these conferences are still a prominent concern in today's society.